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Abstract. The chapter revisits the potential contribution of politically independent fiscal watchdogs 
(“Fiscal Councils”, or FCs) to improve fiscal performance. A simple theoretical model first illustrates 
that FCs cannot credibly exert a direct constraint on day-to-day policy choices. It is by contributing 
to the broader public debate on fiscal policy—through the provision of unbiased quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, forecasts, and possibly, recommendations—that these institutions can reduce 
informational asymmetries hindering voters’ ability to reward good policies and penalize bad ones. 
The chapter explores the empirical relevance of this argument by looking at the media impact of 
FCs in relation to “real-time” fiscal developments. It appears that FCs activity and media impact 
increase in times of budget slippages or relative fiscal activism, a necessary condition for the 
validity of the theory. However, FCs’ media impact is only weakly correlated with subsequent 
policy changes. 
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2. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The fiscal legacy of the 2008–09 economic and financial crisis brought to the fore serious concerns 
about the capacity of governments to meet their obligations in full. Several vulnerable 
governments came under severe market pressure, including in countries considered so far as safe. 
In the euro area, repeated and sometimes acute bouts of panic seized sovereign debt markets, 
raising the specter of widespread self-fulfilling solvency crises in countries with otherwise 
manageable public debt dynamics.  
 
The need for improved fiscal governance quickly emerged as an essential part of any solution to 
mitigate elevated risks of fiscal crisis. A sound budgeting framework indeed conveys useful 
information about the likely range of future fiscal outcomes. Hence, by making bad states of 
public finances less likely over the medium term, markets are less easily spooked by adverse fiscal 
or macroeconomic shocks, while policymakers can respond more flexibly to such shocks. That is 
the magic bullet of fiscal credibility. 
 
A considerable literature confirms the robust association between strong fiscal performance and 
good fiscal institutions. If the past is a good predictor of the future, institutional reforms could 
anchor a credible commitment to sound fiscal policies and reduce the short-term risk of a bad 
market equilibria. Better fiscal governance comes at an additional premium in the euro area, 
where the risk sharing implied by crisis management measures, calls for safeguards against moral 
hazard. 
 
Fiscal institutions conducive to macroeconomic stability often come in the form of fiscal policy 
rules. Quantitative limits on debts, deficits or spending have long been used to contain fiscal 
profligacy (e.g. Fabrizio and Mody, 2006; and Debrun et al., 2008). Yet experience has revealed 
serious limitations often related to the rules’ inflexibility in the face of adverse or unusual 
circumstances, the lack of supportive budget procedures, or weak political commitment to 
effectively enforce them. Inflexibility ultimately threatens the credibility of the rule itself, as the 
pressure of events can quickly lead to its suspension or even elimination.  
 
Since the mid-1990s, a growing literature has argued that non-partisan watchdogs—often dubbed 
“fiscal councils” (FC) or independent fiscal institutions (IFI)—could shape policymakers’ incentives 
in a more credible and effective way than numerical limits on budgetary aggregates. Through 
independent analysis, assessments, and forecasts, such bodies would raise voters’ awareness 
about the consequences of certain policy paths, helping them reward desirable actions and 
sanction toxic ones (Kopits, 2013; Debrun and others, 2013). By barking loud enough in the face 
undesirable behavior, fiscal watchdogs could foster democratic accountability and fiscal 
soundness. And unlike rigid rules, they could help devise an adequate policy response in most 
circumstances without undermining confidence in governments’ ability to keep public finances on 
a sustainable track. The argument gains particular traction in times of extreme shocks and crises, 
when policy flexibility and credibility are both highly valued.  
 
Establishing an independent FC now figures prominently in characterizations of sound fiscal policy 
frameworks well beyond the narrow circle of public financial management experts (Deutsche 
Bank, 2016). Recent reforms of fiscal governance in the European Union (EU) now mandate 
independent institutions to assess the quality of budgetary forecast and to monitor compliance 
with national fiscal rules. At the EU level, an Advisory Fiscal Board has been created to monitor 
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the implementation of the EU fiscal framework, advise the European Commission on the euro-
area-wide fiscal stance, and facilitate coordination among national IFIs.  
 
Despite a longstanding and active debate in academic and policy circles, it is only recently that the 
economic analysis of FCs has developed beyond sketchy and largely informal policy papers and 
opinion pieces (Calmfors, 2010; Calmfors and Wren Lewis, 2011; Debrun, Hauner and Kumar, 
2009; Kopits, 2013; and Debrun et al, 2013). Economic theory discussing the desirability and 
effectiveness of such institutions remains in its infancy (see Debrun, 2011, and Beetsma and 
Debrun, 2016a, b), whereas systematic empirical evidence exploring the link between these 
institutions and fiscal behavior is limited by the very short lifespan of most FCs (Debrun et al., 
2013). As a result, no definitive consensus exists as regards the tasks fiscal councils should be 
assigned, what institutional form they should take, and the complementarity or instead 
substitutability with rules-based frameworks.  
 
This chapter is an effort to fill some of those gaps. In Section II, we sketch a highly stylized and 
purely illustrative model to anchor the debate on politically independent fiscal agencies. An 
important aspect is that the effectiveness of fiscal councils rests on their ability to address the 
root cause rather than the symptoms of deficit bias. Section III gathers empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of existing fiscal councils, looking at two testable hypotheses emanating from 
theory. First, councils can only credibly affect policymakers’ incentives and actions if they 
systematically influence the public debate on fiscal policy. In other words, we want to see 
whether the watchdog barks when the risk of fiscal misbehavior looms large. Using data originally 
collected for case studies in Curristine et al., (2013), we assess the media impact of fiscal councils 
at times where we would expect them to speak out, that is in the aftermath of budgetary 
slippages or policy shifts. Second, we test whether desirable policy changes follow peaks in media 
impact, which would be consistent with the FC’s ability to encourage better fiscal behavior. In 
other words, are political decision makers sufficiently impressed by the barking to correct 
undesirable actions. Finally, the paper emulates other recent pieces—especially Calmfors and 
Wren-Lewis (2011)—by gathering more forensic evidence on what councils do and achieve. 
Concluding remarks form the fourth and last Section of the chapter. 
 
II.   FISCAL POLICY, FISCAL COUNCILS AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
Since the late 1980s, a large literature has explored the reasons why macroeconomic policies tend 
to deviate from a well-defined social optimum (see Kumar and Ter-Minassian, 2007, for an 
extensive survey). On the fiscal side, the hypothesis of a deeply entrenched deficit bias transpired 
from the seemingly inexorable rise in debt-to-GDP ratios since the mid-1970s. Today’s public debt 
levels are often unprecedented in peace time. While theories of deficit bias abound, empirical 
analyses have failed to identify a dominant explanation.2 As this literature has been surveyed 
elsewhere (e.g. Calmfors, 2010, Debrun et al., 2008, and Hagemann, 2010), we limit ourselves to 
present a highly stylized two-period model of fiscal policy whose main virtue is to illustrate how 
fiscal councils can help improve fiscal performance without assuming the delegation of policy 
instruments inherent to the theory of central bank independence (Wyplosz, 2005).  
 
2 Fragmented government coalitions (e.g. Fabrizio and Mody, 2006) and political instability (Debrun and Kumar, 2009) 
emerge as more robust causes of excessive deficit. This may reflect common pool problems—that is the failure to 
coordinate competing claims on finite budget resources—as well as the fear of not being re-elected (implying myopia for 
politician)—see e.g. Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010). 
4. 
A.   A SIMPLE ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL 
Consider the two-period model of Alesina and Tabellini (1990), assuming constant and 
deterministic income levels. Identical private agents maximize utility U, which is separable over 
time and types of goods (private and public). 
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where c denotes the per-capita consumption of private goods and q the per-capita consumption 
of public goods. 0E  symbolizes the expectations operator conditional on information available at 
the beginning of period 1 (time 0), and   is a subjective discount factor. Assuming a constant 
proportional income tax rate  , resource constraints simply write: 
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with R, the interest factor and l, the stock of net private liabilities at the end of period 1. 
 
Elected officials decide on public good provision. They belong to one of two political parties (C or 
L) indexed by Q. Preferences are identical across political parties and to those of the population, 
but officials only value public goods when in office. These assumptions avoid the needless 
complexity of a partisan cycle in the conduct of fiscal policy, leading to a simple and well-defined 
deficit bias.  
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with   0tC qv  if party L is in office, and   0tL qv  if party C is in office. Elections with uncertain 
outcome take place at the end of period 1, and the parameter 1t  captures the probability of the 
incumbent party to be in office at period t.  
 
The resource constraints of the government determines the amount of public goods (per capita) 
delivered in each period: 
 
11   byq  ,                                                        (3a) 
 
22   Rbyq ,                                                      (3b) 
with b denoting the overall deficit at the end of period 1 (or equivalently, the principal of the debt 
to be repaid in period 2). The resource constraints are subject to random shocks affecting 
government efficiency. For a given amount of resources (tax revenue and borrowing), a positive 
realization of δ negatively affects public good delivery. Concretely, this could capture resource 
diversion by corrupt civil servants, the effect of poor administrative capacities, or unforeseeable 
policy mistakes. Of course, good surprises can also occur (more public goods being delivered with 
the same budgetary envelope). Hence, the shocks are non-serially correlated with zero mean and 
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finite variance:  2,0~  Nt . Also, we assume that fiscal policy decisions have no impact on 
income, and thereby, on private consumption since R is given and independent of b. Hence, these 
shocks capture the effect of good (or bad) luck on policymakers’ performance. 
In this model, a deficit bias3 emerges because elected officials are uncertain about re-election. 
This is immediately clear from a comparison of equations (1) and (2): any 1  entails 
policymakers’ myopia (she discounts the future at a higher rate than a representative agent). 
While uncertainty is often exogenously given (e.g. Beetsma and Debrun, 2007), we argue that 
informational asymetries between voters and policymakers can be instrumental in making 
election outcomes uncertain and are therefore at the root of the deficit bias. Specifically, we 
make the plausible assumption that voters cannot know for sure whether a given outcome in 
terms of public good delivery reflects the intrinsic competence of the elected policymaker or an 
exogenous event outside her control affecting efficiency in public good delivery (luck). The 
unobservable shocks affecting public good delivery can thus lead voters to vote out (punish) 
competent officials or re-elect (reward) undeserving individuals.  
B.   CHARACTERIZING THE DEFICIT BIAS 
The socially-optimal solution results from direct maximization of the representative citizen’s 
utility (1) by a benevolent “social planner.” To economize on notation, we set 1 R  
(discount and real interest rates are equal to zero) and assume quadratic utility functions 
2)~()()( xxxvxu  . Decision-makers dislike deviations from pre-determined objectives 
denoted by a tilde. The Euler equation under the social planner yields a balanced budget: 
 *2*1 qq 0* b .                                                          (4) 
Before deriving the political equilibrium—i.e. elected policymakers’ choice—let us clarify the 
sequence of moves. First, “Nature” draws the governing party (C by assumption here). Then, party 
C officials prepare a budget setting the deficit for period 1, and by extension, the expected time 
path of public consumption over the two periods. Third, an efficiency shock materializes during 
period 1, and finally, elections take place. In period 2, all debts are paid off after a new shock 
occured. Solving this problem by backward-induction rules out time-inconsistency. 
As noted above , the probability of re-election is a central determinant of the budget deficit in the 
political equilibrium, denoted by a ** superscript:  
bb ~1
1** 



 
 , with yqb  ~~ .                                            (5) 
Certainty about election outcomes defines two boundary cases. Certain re-election ( 1 ) 
eliminates myopia, leading party C officials to opt for a balanced budget: *1
** 0 bb  . By 
contrast, certain defeat maximizes myopia to the point that party C is not bound by the 
intertemporal budget constraint and chooses a level of public spending consistent with the 
expected delivery of q~  in period 1. The corresponding budget deficit is bb ~0**  . All other 
solutions fall in the ൣ0, 𝑏෨൧ interval. Myopic policymakers generate a deficit bias only if 0~ b , 
 
3 The term deficit bias means that a utility-maximizing policymaker delivers a fiscal balance that is systematically 
weaker than if a representative agent was directly in charge of fiscal policy. 
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which requires that the appetite for delivering public goods (parametrized by 𝑞෤) exceeds available 
tax money. This condition can be interpreted as the common pool problem inherent to budgetary 
decisions so that *** bb  . It is important to note that because voters’ behavior remains purely 
exogenous, this deficit bias emerges in a political setting without formal democratic 
accountability. 
  
C.   SOLVING THE DEFICIT BIAS: FISCAL RULES VS. COUNCILS  
We now compare how fiscal rules and fiscal councils can affet policy outcomes.  
BALANCED BUDGET RULE 
A straightforward solution to the deficit bias could be a balanced-budget requirement. A fiscal 
rule affects policymakers’ decisions to the extent that violating it entails a certain cost measurable 
in terms of utility. The costs can be merely reputational or result from a formal enforcement 
procedure with explicit sanctions (Beetsma and Debrun, 2007). Under a fiscal rule, the 
“constrained” utility of the elected official would be: 
 *bbfUV CC   .                                                      (6) 
 
Policymakers now maximize CV  instead of CU , as they internalize some costs of exceeding the 
deficit ceiling 𝑏∗. The optimal fiscal rule is such that bf ~)1(*   (the marginal cost of 
deviations), which implements 𝑏∗ in the political equilibrium (𝑏∗∗ = 𝑏∗). The optimal rule thus 
imposes higher costs of breaching the deficit cap in countries where political instability (lower 𝜌) 
and the common pool problem (higher 𝑏෨) are more severe. 
 
Of course, showing that an optimal rule exists does not mean that policymakers have any 
incentive to set it up in the first place.4 In fact, it is straightforward to establish that the rule (𝑓∗, 𝑏∗) violates the participation constraints of the policymakers as    **0*0 qUEqVE CC  . 
Hence, even if policymakers inherit the rule from benevolent founding fathers, they will have an 
incentive to make it irrelevant or to scrap it altogether. Time-inconsistency destroys the credibility 
of the rule (Debrun and Kumar, 2009), which explains in part why these arrangements periodically 
come under intense pressure, are eliminated, substantially modified, circumvented, or 
temporarily ignored.5  
 
Note that the time-inconsistency problem as characterized here may a priori be less severe in the 
case of supranational fiscal rules because the latter require international coordination to be 
changed. However, the experience with the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU suggests that 
supranational rules are not immune from changes and circumventions. The Pact has been 
 
4 This argument is analogous to McCallum’s (1995) second fallacy of central bank independence, stating that if 
governments have the discretion to set up an independent central bank with the right incentives, they also have the 
discretion to revert to a dependent central bank with inadequate incentives. Jensen (1997) formally demonstrates in the 
Barro-Gordon-Rogoff framework that delegation does not matter if the no-renegotiation assumption is lifted. 
5 The problems have been documented and extensively discussed for numerical fiscal rules. However, in part because 
fiscal councils can complicate attempts to circumvent rules—e.g. by exposing accounting tricks and inadequate 
implementation of the rule—they are also exposed to attempts to reduce their influence. The abolition of the Hungarian 
Fiscal Council—created only two years earlier—is a vivid illustration of the inherent fragility of discipline-enhancing 
fiscal institutions. Beetsma and Debrun (2016b) formally model circumstances under which a country that has initially 
established a fiscal council could eliminate it following elections.  
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thoroughly amended twice (in 2005 and 2010) since its introduction in 1997, its implementation 
has been uneven across countries—with large and influential member states seemingly 
benefitting from greater leniency6—and it has encouraged certain countries to mask the true 
state of public finances through sometimes egregious accounting manipulations. 
 
Fiscal Councils 
The main lesson from the above exercise is that any mechanism aimed at directly constraining 
fiscal discretion is bound to be resisted by policymakers and therefore, at a high risk of being 
weakened or dismantled as soon as the opportunity arises. Now the question is whether non-
partisan fiscal agencies could at least appeal to policymakers (i.e. satisfy their participation 
constraint) and help to correct the deficit bias inherent to the political equilibrium.  
The answer is arguably positive if we think of the FC as an institution that can induce meaningful 
rewards for policymakers that pursue policies closer to the social optimum. To illustrate this, we 
incorporate in the model the basic requirement that elected officials are accountable to their 
principal (the voters). An immediate task is therefore to show that the deficit bias persists even if 
voters can credibly sanction inadequate policies and vote out an incumbent perceived as unable 
to deliver enough public goods given available resources.  
The failure of accountable governments to deliver the social optimum can be linked to 
informational asymmetries discussed earlier: voters’ preferences may be hard to read, whereas 
the abilities and true agenda of those running for office are unobservable to voters. As a result, 
policy mistakes (successes) can be difficult to detect, interpret, and adequately sanction (reward) 
because they are indistinguishable from the effect of luck.  
Thus, for the sake of the argument, we make two basic assumptions. First, voters cannot observe 
the intrinsic competence of policymakers nor the shocks to public good delivery. Second, opaque 
public accounts prevent voters from assessing whether observable outcomes are the result of 
either luck or competent policy making. Formally, this means that the efficiency shocks t  and the 
true level of debt (deficit) are unobservable ex-post. Only tax revenues and actual output in terms 
of public goods are perfectly observed. (Voters only know for sure what they pay and what they 
get.) The combination of unobservable competence and observable outcomes implies that voters 
will use the size of 1q  as a signal of competence.7 In our stylized setup, it effectively means that if 
they could observe 1 , voters would interpret it as the incumbent’s capacity to deliver public 
goods given fixed budgetary resources.  
Rational voters can thus only observe a “subjective” budget balance—i.e. the difference between 
the public goods they get and the tax money they pay. That measure reflects a shock ( 1 ) and 
noise due to imperfect fiscal transparency ( ):  
11   yqC  ,                                                        (7) 
 
6 See the chapter by Eyraud, Gaspar and Poghosyan in this volume. 
7 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) first introduced that type of conjecture in formal models 
of fiscal policy. 
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where Cq1  denotes what voters’s perceived value of the public goods they consume—which also 
reflects the true budget balance. To infer the incumbent’s efficiency/competence (which boils 
down to 1 ), voters solve a basic signal-extraction problem at the end of period 1: 
   yqE C      122
2
11                                                 (8) 
As voters’ best guess of 1  reflects their assessment of the incumbent’s competence, voters will 
form beliefs about the incumbent’s competence on the basis of  11 E , which amounts to treat 
  as persistent:    1121  ECQE   with 10   , while   021  LQE  .  
 
The incumbent will be re-elected if voters expect her to deliver more public goods given the 
remaining budgetary resources (which are the same for both parties). Formally, re-election occurs 
if     02121  LQqECQqE . At time 0 (budget preparation stage for period 1), the 
perceived probability of re-election is therefore:   


  0Pr 122
2
yqC 


 .  
This shows that political incentives leading to a deficit bias remain even after explicitly introducing 
democratic accountability in the model. The difference with Section II.B is that because the 
probability of re-election depends positively on the (ex-post) realization of the budget balance, 
policymakers now face an opportunistic (ex-ante) motive to run a deficit. Indeed, a deficit reduces 
the likelihood that voters will detect adverse efficiency realizations at the end of period 1, which 
they would interpret as a lack of competence and a motive to vote against the incumbent.  
What could be the role of an independent fiscal agency? The analysis above suggests that an 
institution able to clearly inform voters whether or not the incumbent behaved consistently with 
an ex-ante intent to produce *1q  would solve the kind of asymmetric information problem 
described above, and as a result, would contribute to eliminate the deficit bias that such 
asymmetry entails. For example, providing quantitative and qualitative analyses of fiscal policy (ex 
ante and in real time) could in principle help voters see through policymakers’ incentives and 
fiscal accounts so as to better grasp the adequacy of the observed policy stance. By definition, 
such an institution should be politically independent and have a broad remit that could include 
elements of judgment on the nature of shocks to the budget. If voters are better equipped to 
distinguish between bad luck and bad intentions, they can make better decisions, eliminating 
opportunistic motives, and directly rewarding competent governments with greater re-election 
chances.8 
In sum, a well-functioning FC, by becoming the main source of information on the underlying 
quality of fiscal policy would allow democratic accountability to play its role. Of course, placing 
such a considerable amount of trust in a fiscal council would require strict guarantees of 
independence from partisan influences, a clear definition of the policy objectives under the 
council’s scrutiny (e.g. fiscal sustainability) and a modus operandi genuinely “owned” by voters. 
 
8 Beetsma and Debrun (2016a) demonstrate this in a simple Bayesian game with unobservable competence based on the 
same basic setup as in this chapter. They formally show that FCs contribute to improve average fiscal performance by (i) 
having competent governments elected more often, and (ii) encouraging incompetent governments to mimic a competent 
one. 
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III.   FISCAL COUNCILS, THE PUBLIC DEBATE AND FISCAL POLICY 
This section gathers empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal councils with a deliberate 
focus on the watchdog function, that is the ability of the FC to signal fiscal misconduct. We focus 
on two empirical questions: Does the watchdog bark when it should? And is the barking 
sufficiently impressive to deter misconduct and improve policy outcomes? To measure the impact 
of fiscal watchdogs in the public debate, we use the dataset on the media impact of fiscal councils 
compiled for the case studies in Curristine et al., (2013). This chapter thus complements the 
existing empirical literature, which relies mainly on thorough country case studies (e.g. Calmfors 
and Wren-Lewis, 2011; Coene and Langenus, 2011) and largely illustrative correlations between 
outcomes and specific features of fiscal councils (Debrun et al., 2013).  
 
A.   THE APPROACH 
Our approach is two-fold. First, we build on the theoretical sketch developed above to explore the 
influence of FCs on the public debate through direct measures of their media impact. Second, two 
short case studies analyze the media impact in greater details. The use of higher-frequency data 
(monthly instead of annual) allows for a more refined assessment of the noise-to-signal ratio of 
media reports.  
 
The media impact variable is based on the number of times the official name of the FC appears in 
a country’s national press (either in English or in national language(s)). We use simple panel 
regressions to detect a relationship between the intensity of media reports referring to the FC and 
two real-time fiscal policy indicators expected to be of interest for the fiscal council. The first is 
the planned change in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) at the beginning of the year, 
which captures the degree of fiscal activism planned in the budget (stimulus or consolidation). 
The second is the first estimate of the deviation in the CAB with respect to plans. This variable is 
interpreted as a symptom9 of slippages (or over-performance) during the budget year although its 
signaling power is affected by possibly large revisions in estimated output gaps. 
 
Clearly, the results reported in the remainder of this Section only constitute a first exploration, a 
potential “appetizer” for further research that will be needed when the large number of new 
fiscal councils will have gathered sufficiently long experience. One source of concern is the 
reliability of the underlying media data, which could create unwanted noise in the statistical 
analysis. For instance, it is difficult to assess whether the comprehensiveness of press coverage is 
comparable across countries. Another potential issue is that the straightforward measure of 
media impact that we use10 could capture events only loosely related to the national budgetary 
debate, for example political bickering about the appointment of a new FC member.  
 
B.   DATA, NOTATION AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES  
Data Sources and Notation 
 
Real-time fiscal and economic data are collected from the European Commission’s assessments of 
Stability and Convergence Programs (SCP)—typically discussed in early spring on the basis of data 
transmitted by national authorities. To save on the notation, we omit country indices and use 
time superscripts to denote the vintage of the Commission’s assessment of SCPs. As a result, 𝑋௧௧ is 
 
9 See Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Wierts (2009). 
10 All media data used in the cases studies of Curristine et al. (2013) come from the Factiva database. 
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the “real-time” forecast of 𝑋௧ at the beginning of year 𝑡, whereas 𝑋௧௧ାଵ is the first estimate of the 
realization of 𝑋௧. The Δ operator symbolizes the first-difference of a variable over time. Hence, ΔX୲୲ = 𝑋௧௧ − 𝑋௧ିଵ௧  measures the planned “real time” variation in X between t and 𝑡 − 1, while ΔX୲୲ାଵ = 𝑋௧௧ାଵ − 𝑋௧ିଵ௧ାଵ is the “first estimate” of the actual change. Finally, we define the “forecast 
error” of X as 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑋௧௧ାଵ = 𝑋௧௧ାଵ − 𝑋௧௧. 
 
Due to severe data limitations on the media dataset, the sample only includes 7 continental 
European countries—Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Slovenia—over the period 2003-2010—years with comprehensive assessments of SCP by the 
European Commission. To maximize the time dimension, the main fiscal policy indicator is the 
cyclically-adjusted balance (CAB) instead of the more conventional cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance, which was not consistently reported in SCPs by all countries in the early years of the 
sample. The set of control variables is necessarily parsimonious given the small size of the sample. 
It includes the gross public debt (DEBT) and the output gap (OG). The key indicator of media 
impact, NEWS, is the standardized number (z-score) of written press articles quoting the national 
fiscal council (in English and local language(s)). It reflects the intensity of the news coverage of the 
FC’s activity in each country, and is thus taken as a proxy of its participation in the public debate 
on fiscal matters.  
 
Testable Hypotheses 
 
Theory points to two testable hypotheses. First, a necessary condition for the effectiveness of an 
FC is that it publicly reacts to fiscal developments either because they signal a policy shift with a 
notable bearing on the realization of policy objectives or because undesirable deviations from 
planned outcomes call for an analysis of the causes—bad luck or bad budget execution. To the 
extent that these reactions contribute to the public debate, the FC will enhance democratic 
controls. In that case, a change in the NEWS variable follows variations in fiscal indicators. Second, 
an effective council would be expected to make a difference in the conduct of fiscal policy. This 
would imply that changes in fiscal indicators would tend to follow peaks in FCs media activity. The 
analysis focuses on the planned change in the CAB—a proxy for deliberate policy action—and the 
forecast error—which could reflect unexpected shocks affecting the budget or policy slippages.  
 
C.   RESULTS 
We first document systematic differences in key fiscal dimensions between the 7 countries that 
have an FC—hereafter FC7—considered in our analysis and the others—i.e. countries that do not 
have an FC and those that might have introduced an FC more recently. The FC7 countries exhibit 
on average stronger fiscal balances than the rest of the European Union (Figure 1). By contrast, 
while public debts were higher—by about 10 percentage points of GDP—in FC7 prior to the crisis, 
they are slightly lower on average by end-2014. As the stronger fiscal positions may in part reflect 
greater concerns about debt stabilization, we also compare the two groups in terms of market 
perceptions of sovereign risk (Figure 2). Again, the FC7 enjoys much lower spreads on average 
than other EU countries, even after excluding the euro area periphery. 
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Figure 1. Fiscal Performance in EU Countries with Fiscal Councils (FC7) and other EU Member States 
(percent of GDP) 
 
 
 
Sources: European Commission and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2. CDS spreads (5-year) in EU Countries with Fiscal Councils (FC7) and the Other EU Member States 
 (basis points) 
 
Sources: Markit and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Do the Watchdogs Bark When Needed? 
Using our 7-country sample over 2003–2010, we estimate the following model: NEWS୲ = c +d୲ + αFISC୲୲ା୧ + ε୲, where FISC is a fiscal indicator, 𝑑௧, time dummies, and 𝑐 indicates the use of country fixed-effects. The fiscal indicator is either the planned variation in the CAB at the 
beginning of year t (so 𝑖 = 0) or the first estimate (in early 𝑡 + 1) of the forecast error (𝑖 = 1), 
while NEWS captures the intensity of citations in the press during the entire year t.  
The regressions reported in Table 1 detect a statistically significant correlation between our two 
fiscal indicators and the media impact of FCs. On average, the fiscal watchdogs seem to bark 
louder when large fiscal policy changes are planned and they seem to be heard in the press. The 
fiscal councils in our sample also tend to be more present in the media during years when forecast 
errors end up being greater, suggesting that they publicly reveal policy slippages or express 
concerns when unexpected shocks send budget plans off track. Interestingly, the negative signs 
obtained for the first differenced CAB and the raw forecast error suggest that deteriorations in 
the CAB leads to increased media attention to FCs’ messages. This is consistent with the role of 
FCs in primarily promoting fiscal responsibility.  
Table 1. Media Impact of FCs and Magnitude of Fiscal Developments 
(Dependent variable is NEWS) 
 ΔCAB |ΔCAB| ERRCAB |ERRCAB| 
FISC -0.392*** 0.721*** -0.217* 0.453** 
 (-4.96) (4.68) (-2.25) (3.42) 
Const. 0.113*** -0.246** 0.207*** -0.176 
 (5.17) (-2.47) (58.47) (-1.51) 
Adj. R2 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.13 
N. obs. 51 51 51 51 
Note: All regressions include country fixed effects; robust t-statistics are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting statistical 
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent threshold respectively. 
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While these results provide an indication that FCs may be effective in sending the right messages 
at the right time, the limited size of the sample and the potentially weak signaling power of media 
activity call for caution. In particular, fiscal developments explain only a small fraction of the 
quantity of news reports referring to the FCs. Also, the introduction of time dummies severely 
reduces the precision in the estimated impact of fiscal indicators on FCs presence in the media, 
suggesting that the results in Table 1 may capture developments—such as the crisis—that jointly 
affect the budget and FCs reported activity.  
 
Do FCs Influence the Conduct of Fiscal Policy? 
 
Following our earlier discussion, the underlying regression is as follows: |∆𝐶𝐴𝐵௧௧| = c+ d୲ + δNEWS୲ିଵ + βଵDEBT୲ିଵ୲ + βଶOG୲ିଵ୲ +ε୲. In contrast to the first set of 
regressions, we introduce a few control variables known to be related to fiscal developments, 
namely the cyclical position of the economy (lagged output gap), and the (lagged) public debt 
level. As regards the left-hand-side variable, we could only detect meaningful correlations 
between the absolute value of the planned change in the CAB for year t and FCs media presence 
in year 𝑡 − 1.  
 
As Table 2 suggests, stronger media presence of the fiscal council in any given year is correlated 
with greater planned “fiscal activism” for the following year, regardless of whether the plans 
envisage a more ambitious fiscal consolidation or a greater stimulus. The results are fairly 
consistent across alternative regressions (fixed-effects or pooled) and to the inclusion of the only 
two statistically significant time dummies (2007 and 2008). The control variables display the 
expected signs: a reduction in the output gap (less positive or more negative) encourages fiscal 
activism, whereas high public debts are less conducive to activism.  
 
While it may be tempting to conclude that more intense FC involvement in the public debate 
pushes governments to do the right thing, the paucity and quality of the data and the fragility of 
the results call for caution. In addition, simultaneity problems loom large, as the plans for year t 
are prepared and discussed intensively in the second part of the preceding year. The results may 
thus reflect the fact that FCs are simply taking an active part to the debate surrounding budget 
preparation, particularly when significant policy shifts are discussed. While this would be welcome 
and supportive of the evidence in Table 1, it might not necessarily reflect the council’s actual 
influence on policy choices. Taking two lags to the NEWS variable did not help, suggesting that the 
distance between the council’s message and actual decision making would then be too large. 
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Table 2. Do Fiscal Councils Shape Policy Outcomes? 
(Dependent variable: absolute value of the one-year-ahead ΔCAB) 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent threshold 
respectively. 
 
D.   GOING FORENSIC: FISCAL COUNCILS AND THE BUDGET PROCESS  
While promising, the preliminary evidence on a link between FCs media presence and fiscal 
indicators—which only convey a clear policy signal at annual frequency—calls for a much more 
detailed analysis that goes beyond the scope of the present paper. Insights can nevertheless be 
gained from a more “forensic” analysis, involving higher frequency data. In contrast to more 
comprehensive case studies of fiscal councils (e.g. the analysis of Sweden and the United Kingdom 
by Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011), we focus on the link between certain fiscal episodes and FCs 
media visibility.  
 
Two case studies of long-lasting fiscal councils are interesting in that regard: The Netherlands’ 
Bureau of economic Analysis—better known under its Dutch acronym of CPB—and the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement Section of Belgium’s High Council of Finance. The selection of two 
well-established institutions offers some guarantees that the media quotes capture the actual 
impact of their routine work on the public debate. Analyzing new or failed institutions could 
distort the measure of media presence because the press could report on debates about the 
council itself—e.g. public discussions about individual appointments or reports about personal or 
political conflicts preceding the FC’s demise—rather than fiscal policy. Belgium and The 
Netherlands also have the advantage to operate in a context where rules and numerical norms 
have typically played an important role. This facilitates the identification of specific “stress” 
episodes—e.g. clear threat of breaking a rule or an official numerical target—during which the FC 
would be expected to communicate.    
  
Estimator:
LSDV LSDV LSDV Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
NEWS 0.110 0.146* 0.153* 0.108** 0.108**
(1.62) (2.03) (2.14) (2.36) (2.37)
OG -0.347** (0.271) -0.229* -0.324*** -0.325***
(-2.63) (-2.27)* (-2.08) (-3.93) (-3.96)
DEBT (0.010) (0.022) (0.001)
(-0.59) (-1.28) (-0.17)
i2007 0.510* 0.492*** 0.498***
(1.99) (3.30) (3.33)
i2008 1.687** 1.306** 1.193** 1.601*** 1.605***
(3.46) (2.93) (2.75) (5.10) (5.22)
Const. 0.665 1.534 0.339** 0.178 0.147*
(0.67) (1.67) (2.90) (0.92) (1.70)
Adj. R2 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.56 
N. Obs. 44 44 44 44 44 
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Case Study 1: The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis—known under its old-days acronym of CPB, 
for Central Planning Bureau—is a veteran among fiscal councils, beginning operations in 1945. It 
has been preparing economic forecasts since the 1950s, publishing reports on the state of Dutch 
public finances since the 1960s, undertaking election commitment costing since the 1980s, and 
preparing long-term scenario analyses since the 1990s. The CPB also has a number of other roles, 
including cost-benefit analysis, and a fairly broad research agenda.  
 
The CPB is formally a branch of the civil service within the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MEA) and 
it is funded from the budget. Despite the lack of a separate status for staff and the financial 
dependency on the budget, several elements contribute to the independence of the CPB, 
including a supervisory committee, whose members are appointed by the cabinet for 5 years, and 
5 yearly independent evaluations (usually by academics, many of whom are not Dutch nationals). 
 
Like most FCs, the CPB cannot bite: it has no explicit mandate or instrument to directly influence 
fiscal policy. Also, it does not provide strictly normative assessments, not even against the 
government’s own commitments and objectives. That said, the CPB evaluates quantitatively the 
effect of government policies on public finances. Clearly, a positive statement saying that the 
continuation of a certain policy is bound to threaten fiscal sustainability is not materially different 
from a normative judgment that such policy should be changed. 
 
Another positive way for the CPB to enter into normative territories at politically critical times 
relates to its role of costing electoral platforms before, and coalition agreements after elections. 
That function has arguably improved the quality of public information and influenced the debate 
around elections, encouraging parties to tighten up their commitments in advance (in order for 
costing to be undertaken) and to avoid making commitments to unaffordable policies (see Bos 
and Teulings, 2011). 
 
The CPB is an insider working within the budget process. It provides the macroeconomic forecasts 
used for the budget. Those forecasts are produced behind closed doors, and discussed with the 
government (initially through the Ministry of Finance, and later through the cabinet) prior to 
being released. While this means that the budget relies on independent forecasts, private 
discussions with the cabinet give an opportunity to the latter to put pressure on the CPB (Bos and 
Teulings, 2011). For the same reason, the CPB provides little public information regarding the 
evolution of the fiscal outlook during the year, allowing the government to change course, if 
necessary, without raising public awareness. Following meetings with cabinet, the CPB publishes 
its forecasts four times a year, with more extensive updates in March and September than in June 
and December.  
 
Overall, this set of attributes, combined with a long history of well regarded analysis and forecasts 
have given a considerable degree of public credibility to the CPB. While its specific contribution is 
difficult to identify, the Netherlands’ fiscal performance over the past 15 years has been relatively 
sound. In particular, there has been no apparent bias in macroeconomic forecasts, ex-post 
compliance with ex-ante targets has been satisfactory. 
 
Let us look at each of these three aspects in greater details. Using data from the SCPs, we 
calculate the real GDP growth forecasting errors (at 1, 2 and 3 years’ horizons) across countries 
over the period 2000 – 2014. In the Netherlands, the average errors for the budget year have 
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been, if anything, pessimistic; and while they appear slightly optimistic over the out-years, they 
remain well within one standard deviation of GDP growth in the sample. The same is true for the 
other countries, whose fiscal councils received the remit of providing independent 
macroeconomic forecasts into the budget (Austria and Belgium). This is in line with earlier results 
by Jonung and Larch (2006) showing that independent forecasting help prevent an optimistic bias 
in GDP forecasts (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Real GDP Forecast Errors (Actual minus Forecast): 2000–2014 
(Percentage points) 
 
Sources: European Commission (SCPs) and authors’ calculations. 
 
We now turn to the compliance with ex-ante targets set over the political cycle. The Dutch budget 
system is governed by the coalition agreements reached at the beginning of each parliamentary 
term. These agreements specify, among other things, a deficit ceiling for the remainder of the 
term: bold black lines in Figure 4. The Figure also displays yearly forecasts for the budget balance 
(light grey lines), and the final budget outcome (red line).  
 
This comparison allows identifying episodes of interest characterized as follows: (1) either the 
budget forecast or fiscal outturn is exceeding the deficit ceiling, or (2) the fiscal outturn is 
significantly worse than the budget forecast. In either of these cases, we would expect the fiscal 
council to raise the awareness of these outcomes, and make recommendations or suggestions to 
rectify the situation. Using the same media information as above (now at monthly frequency), we 
examine whether this did in fact occur. 
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Sources: CPB and authors’ calculations. 
 
The first episode was in 2002, when the fiscal outturn came out significantly worse than the 
budget forecast, and was in fact approaching the deficit ceiling set in the coalition agreement.  
The second episode occurred in 2003, when the outturn was again significantly worse than 
forecast, but this time actually breached the deficit ceiling. The third and final episode was in 
2005, when the budget forecast exceeded the ceiling, even though the outturn ended up 
comfortably inside the ceiling. The events related to the financial crisis are excluded, because they 
represented a more significant, exogenous shock, with less control available to policy makers.  
 
We now map these episodes in Figure 5, compiling the media presence of the CPB calculated as 
the number of newspaper articles containing a reference to the CPB. We have adjusted and 
corrected that series for trend, looking at the number of articles relative to a four year rolling 
average. The columns highlighted in red refer to the months were the CPB releases its public 
forecasts and fiscal assessments. Some of the spikes observed in the series refer to election 
periods, where the CPB features heavily in the news. 
  
Figure 4. The Netherlands: Fiscal Targets, Forecasts and Outcomes 
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Figure 5. Media Presence of the CPB 
(Number of press articles relative to 4-year rolling-average) 
 
Sources: Factiva and authors’ calculations. 
 
The three episodes identified above coincide with a marked increase in media reports. It is useful 
to note that the major spikes, particularly in 2003 and 2005 relate to the timing where the CPB 
released its public assessments.  
 
An examination of the contents of CPB reports at those times confirms this interpretation. In 
2002, the slippage became apparent towards the end of the year, and the CPB noted in its 
December report that due to the worsening economy, the small surplus achieved in 2001 would 
turn into a deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP in 2002. In 2003, this continued deterioration was noted 
in the March report, where the projections in the Central Economic Plan of that year were revised 
downward and the CPB noted that “additional deficit-reducing measures are necessary to comply 
with the rules from the SGP.” In the December 2003 report, the deficit forecasts were further 
revised upward, with the CPB noting that “even though the 3.35 percent deficit will be just above 
the 3 percent SGP ceiling, this does not mean that Brussels will determine this deficit to be 
“excessive”. Netherlands will probably be able to call on exceptional economic conditions”. In 
2005, the forecast for the year exceeded the agreed deficit ceiling, which prompted the CPB to 
warn in its December 2004 report that: “Regardless of the austerity measures of the government, 
the [2005] deficit stays dangerously close to the 3 percent SGP deficit ceiling”. 
 
Beyond individual episodes, the CPB’s ability to communicate to the public when it has something 
important to say and when it matters most during the budget process is important every year. 
Indeed, a fiscal council constantly out in the public with a running commentary, disconnected 
from important parliamentary budget preparation deadlines would raise doubts about its ability 
to add something important the debate. We can assess this “noise-to-signal” ratio by plotting the 
average monthly seasonal patterns of media presence of the council (Figure 6). The spikes 
suggests that the CPB times its media intervention in a fairly systematic way, taking full advantage 
of the publication of its most extensive reports in March and September to influence the public 
debate. 
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Figure 6. Average Seasonal Pattern of the CPB Media Presence 
 
 
Sources: Factiva and authors’ calculations. 
 
The message emanating from this analysis is consistent with the broader correlations detected 
earlier in the panel of seven countries. While it is difficult to identify a robust causal link between 
the activities of the CPB and improved fiscal performance in the Netherlands, the CPB’s media 
visibility supports the idea that it actively contributes to the quality of the public debate, and 
reduces information asymmetries between decision makers and the public. There is indeed no 
significant forecast bias, the messages of the council appear relevant, and they are communicated 
in an effective and timely manner.  
 
Case Study 2: Belgium 
 
Two bodies provide independent fiscal inputs into the budgetary process in Belgium. Their 
responsibilities are split between the normative recommendations and assessments of fiscal 
policy from the High Council of Finance (more specifically the so-called Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement Section), and the positive, forecast input role of the Federal Planning Bureau (under 
the umbrella of the National Accounts Institute)—see Lebrun (2009). The case of Belgium is of 
particular interest because it is one of the only countries where a fiscal council makes normative 
recommendations. Over the last two decades, the High Council of Finance (HCF) has gone through 
periods of being highly influential, followed by a period where that influence has waned (Coene 
and Langenus, 2011). 
 
The HCF dates back to the 1930s, when it was formed to advise the Ministry of Finance. It only 
converged on its current role in 1989 when it started issuing recommendations on public sector 
borrowing requirements. The main objective of Belgian public finances at the time was to reduce 
the high budget deficit and public debt ratios, which stood at 7 percent and 125 percent of GDP 
respectively in 1988. Much of the Council’s recommendations focused on monitoring and 
coordinating the fiscal effort across the different levels of government. Belgium’s commitment to 
meet the Maastricht criteria provided an opportunity to expand the Council’s normative role with 
recommendations to comply with these criteria as well as medium-term objectives.   
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While the Council does not have any direct instruments to shape budgetary choices, its 
recommendations, compiled in two reports, have often carried significant weight. The first report 
is published at the beginning of budget process (June/July), when the Council provides ex ante 
recommendations for fiscal targets. The second report provides an ex-post assessment of the 
extent to which the government followed the recommendations, and the implementation of the 
stability/convergence program of the previous year. 
 
Unlike the CPB, the institutional set-up governing the HCF is more that of an outsider looking into 
the budget. Its recommendations are developed in a fairly independent manner, for the 
government to take on as it sees fit, rather than being worked out and negotiated behind closed 
doors. The Council is staffed with experts from ministries, the National Bank, the Federal Planning 
Bureau and academia. The Council’s members are appointed by the Minister of Finance for a 5 
year renewable mandate running across electoral cycles, which helps preserve independence. The 
chairperson is often an academic, although ties with political parties often exist. In addition, the 
political principal has at times let the Council’s influence wane. Over the mid 2000s, for instance, 
after a number of unfavorable assessments, the Minister of Finance let the chairman’s mandate 
to lapse without appointing a successor. Although this hiatus did not obviously reflect political 
interference—the composition of the council is subject to many constraints, which can cause 
delays in appointments—it prevented the Council from providing fiscal recommendations, 
resulting in a significant loss of influence for the HCF (Coene and Langenus, 2011).  
 
Overall, the performance of the Council can be broken down into two periods: pre and post euro 
adoption (Coene and Langenus, 2011). In the pre-euro adoption period, the Maastricht 
convergence criteria led to a good alignment of policymakers’ objectives with the Council’s 
recommendations, which were largely followed. During that period, the structural primary surplus 
increased by 5 percent of GDP, public debt started falling and the budget moved towards balance. 
After euro adoption, the weight of convergence criteria in fiscal policy formulation was lost, and 
the appeal of the Council’s recommendations eroded. The primary balance deteriorated sharply, 
as most of the savings on the interest bill benefits were used to fund tax cuts and expenditure 
growth. 
 
Due to data constraints, only the post-euro-adoption period can be subject to a similar analysis as 
the one performed for the CPB. In Figure 7, the Council’s budget year recommendations for the 
fiscal balance are displayed in black, the budget forecast, in gray and the outturn, in red. A 
number of interesting episodes stand out. The first is the two years that follow the adoption of 
the euro in 1999, when outcomes were broadly in line with the Council’s recommendations. The 
second episode is in 2004, when increasing divergences with the council’s recommendations led 
to critical assessments of government policies. Finally, in 2005 and 2006, the Council could not 
produce reports or recommendations as its chair was deliberately left vacant. 
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Figure 7. HCF Budget Balance Recommendations, Forecasts and Outturns 
(in percent of GDP) 
 
Sources: High Council of Finance and authors’ calculations.  
 
We now map these episodes into our measure of media presence of the HCF (Figure 8). In the 
initial period leading up to and during the euro adoption, there was a strong and sustained 
coverage of the Council in the Belgian press. This tails off as the 2000s progress and the Council 
clearly begins losing its influence. In 2004, the Council turned openly critical of government’s 
policies,11 leading to a surge in media reports. Finally, during the period when the Council had no 
formal head and stopped reporting, its media footprint diminished substantially, despite 
emerging discrepancies between plans and outcomes in 2006. 
 
Figure 8. Media Presence of the HCF 
(Number of press articles relative to 4-year rolling-average)  
 
Sources: Factiva and authors’ calculations. 
 
Again, a more detailed analysis of the Council’s reports and press citations support our reading of 
the data. In the early 2000s, when public finances were on track, press articles were relatively 
benign and the HCF reports noted with a fairly neutral tone minor deviations with respect to 
recommendations. For instance, the October 1999 reports observes that “The deficit of the 
 
11 The large deficit in 2005 was almost entirely due to a one-off debt assumption, related to the restructuring of the 
national railway company, which was attributed after the event. 
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central government for 2000 is projected at 1 percent of GDP, which is 0.2 percent higher than 
recommended by the HCF.” The tone of HCF reports changed drastically in 2004. In July of that 
year, the Council launched a stern warning in these terms: “The High Council considers these fiscal 
scenarios unrealistic in the medium-term” and “The High Council wants to point out that the 
deteriorating fiscal position is [not only] due to cyclical factors but also—and mainly—due to 
discretionary measures such as lowering taxes and a major growth in government spending.” Of 
course, there is no report to quote for the last episode. 
 
The monthly pattern of media reporting on the Council is less clear cut and incisive than in the 
Dutch case, pointing to a weaker ability to shape the public debate on fiscal policy (Figure 9). In 
particular, media presence spread out more evenly over the year, and is less concentrated around 
the times when the Council publishes is key fiscal reports (in March and July). Such a pattern 
could also reflect a greater persistence of the Council’s message, for instance because the media 
use the recommendations as a constant benchmark when discussing budgetary matters. 
Supporting that conjecture is the fact that despite less pronounced monthly spikes than in the 
CPB case, there is a concentration of press articles citing the Council in the latter half of the year, 
the period during which the budget is being negotiated and passed through parliament. 
Figure 9. Average Seasonal Pattern of the HCF Media Presence 
 
Sources: Factiva and authors’ calculations. 
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IV.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The chapter discusses how independent fiscal institutions, even though they have no direct 
influence on policy levers, can influence fiscal performance. From a theoretical perspective, the 
effectiveness of FCs depends on their capacity to deal with the root cause of fiscal policy biases, 
and in particular informational asymmetries between voters—the only legitimate principal in the 
policy game—and politicians. They do this by performing tasks that improve the quality of the 
public debate on fiscal policy (analysis, recommendations, assessments, forecasts). This allows the 
general public to properly process and interpret the often complex, opaque and ideologically 
tainted signals received on the performance of policymakers. This line of arguments means that 
FCs should behave and be perceived as serious watchdogs that bark when needed and are 
listened to.  
The chapter offers an empirical assessment of this watchdog role. In line with the conclusions of 
the theoretical model, we try to quantify FCs’ impact through their capacity to influence the 
public debate. We propose to proxy such influence with direct measures of media presence.  
While our exploration of the statistical link between media presence and fiscal policy is promising, 
drawing robust conclusions would require a much broader sample. With only a handful of fiscal 
councils with a sufficiently long lifetime, such exploration can only be considered as a very first 
pass. Keeping these caveats in mind, it seems that on average, fiscal watchdogs bark when it is 
appropriate. This is a necessary condition to ensure that FCs clarify signals about the 
appropriateness of fiscal policy, helping the general public to reward good policies and sanction 
bad ones. If an FC can meaningfully improve policymakers’ incentives, it can credibly strengthen 
fiscal performance. It nevertheless proved more difficult to find evidence of systematic policy 
corrections after peaks in FC media presence. One possible reason for these mixed results is that 
the repercussions of FCs’ activity on the budget process might be more subtle and detectable only 
in specific inputs to the budget rather than in the aggregate fiscal stance itself. For instance, 
Debrun and Kinda (2016) show that the presence of an FC mandated to assess or produce 
budgetary forecasts leads to improvements in their quality (absence of bias and greater 
precision). Two case studies of well-established FCs lends support to the statistical findings. 
An important avenue for future research is to analyze design features of fiscal councils that seem 
conducive to a good capacity to improve the public’s information about the quality of fiscal policy. 
The somewhat contrasted experiences of Belgium and The Netherlands suggest that strict 
independence from politics and recognized expertise in economics and public finances are key for 
the barking to be heard by all and taken seriously by policymakers. 
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